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1 Introduction
The human Faculty of Language (FL)—the mental faculty which plays a cen-
tral role in the acquisition and processing of natural languages—enables us to
systematically produce and understand an unbounded number of novel expres-
sions. More precisely, if ‘FLS ’ is the FL of an arbitrary competent speaker S
of some natural language E (English, Spanish, etc.), then:
(PRODUCTIVITY) FLS can generate correct interpretations (relative to E)
for complex expressions which S has never encountered before. FLS has
this capacity for indefinitely many distinct complex expressions, generat-
ing a distinct meaning for an indefinite number of these expressions.
(SYSTEMATICITY) The generative capacity of FLS is structured in the
following way: if it can generate correct interpretations (relative to E)
for complex expressions e1, . . . , en, it can generate correct interpretations
for all other complex expressions constructed from: (i) constituents of
e1, . . . , en and (ii) syntactic structures employed in any of the complex
expressions e1, . . . , en.
For a long time, it was held that the best way to explain PRODUCTIVITY
and SYSTEMATICITY (henceforth ‘P&S’)1 is to assume that FL includes a
recursive computational system with a compositional semantics.2 Roughly, a
computational system is ‘compositional’ if (i) it contains both primitive and
syntactically complex symbols, and (ii) it is constrained to determine the se-
mantic properties of its complex symbols only from their structure and the
semantic properties of their immediate constituents.
Recently, however, several prominent linguists, philosophers and cognitive
scientists have criticized the view that FL is compositional, and especially the
argument from P&S.3 There is some truth to these criticisms. The traditional
argument for compositionally is indeed substantially incomplete. No one doubts
that assuming that FL is compositional is one way of explaining P&S; but there
are now other reasonable explanations which assume that FL is not composi-
tional.4 This presents an important challenge. For the assumption that FL
is compositional has shaped the way we theorize about basically every central
aspect of our linguistic competence.
1Here we will assume that P&S are essentially correct. Although widely accepted, esp. in
discussions of the non/compositionality of FL, P&S are not completely uncontroversial (see
e.g. Pullum and Scholz [71], [61]). For an extensive defense of P&S, see Del Pinal [56].
2The most famous version of this argument was presented by Fodor to defend the compo-
sitionality of both natural languages and thought (see Fodor and Pylyshyn [24], Fodor [21],
Fodor and Lepore [23]). However, Fodor recently presented some arguments to the effect that
natural languages don’t seem to be compositional (Fodor [22]).
3Some theorists argue on general grounds that our linguistic competence is (probably)
not compositional (see Jonsson [39]; Hampton and Jonsson [33]; Johnson [38]; Travis [81];
Lahav [42]). Others argue that although it might be compositional, the general arguments
usually taken to establish this are not very persuasive (see Szabo [76], [78]; Dever [18]; Pagin
and Westersthl [49]; Baggio et al. [1]).
4Jonsson’s illuminating [39], which we will discuss in detail in what follows, presents various
non-compositional explanations of P&S.
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Despite these criticisms, I will argue that assuming that FL is compositional
is still the best explanation of P&S. I begin by proposing that we should
frame debates about the non/compositionality of FL as debates about the fixed,
innate structure of the part of FL which computes the meanings of complex
expressions (§2-3). Given this framework, we can determine, for each competing
explanation of P&S, its broad empirical consequences for language acquisition
and development. I then show that, unlike assuming that FL is compositional,
the non-compositional accounts of P&S entail that, in the course of acquiring
a natural language, speakers should go through certain stages of early linguistic
development which, it turns out, speakers never seem to go through (§4-5). This
strongly suggests that FL is compositional. In the final section I discuss some
objections to this argument (§6).
2 The Faculty of Language as a Cognitive Com-
putational System
Following the tradition of computational psychology, we will assume that FL
is a language-processing cognitive computational system. This approach has
been famously advocated by Chomsky [8], [9], [10]. The view I present below is
Chomskian, but in a weak sense that can be welcomed by theorists of different
theoretical orientations. This approach revolves around two basic theoretical
notions: ‘I-languages’ and ‘languages’. Both terms require some explication.
By a ‘language’ I mean a set of pairs of acoustic/visual signals and mean-
ings or interpretations which characterizes a natural language. For example,
‘English’ is a set consisting of certain pairs of acoustic/visual signals and mean-
ings, e.g., (red, red), (John is happy, happy (john)), (red wall, red wall),
and so on. A ‘language’, as I am using the term, is ‘extensionally defined’ but
not an external or mind-independent abstract structure of the sort Chomsky [8]
argues is of no relevance to the study of FL. Specifically, ‘languages’ consist
of the input/output pairs of representations which ‘I-languages’ compute, i.e.,
they specify the main cognitive task which ‘I-languages’ solve.5
Most linguistic theorists agree that, to compute languages, I-languages need
to carry-out at least three main cognitive tasks: (i) map acoustic/visual sig-
nals into expressions (phonetics), (ii) map expressions into syntactic structures
(syntax), (iii) map syntactic structures into meanings or interpretations (seman-
tics). An ‘I-language’ then is a cognitive computational system that can generate
phonetic structures, syntactic structures, and semantic structures or interpre-
tations. For example, think of ‘I-English’ as a cognitive computational system
5‘English’, as used here, does not exactly correspond to what we ordinarily mean by ‘En-
glish’. For example, ‘English’, as ordinarily used, does not include the expression the child
seems sleeping. But the meaning of this expression is arguably computed by I-English, so it
is part of English, as here defined (see Pietroski and Crain (forthcoming)). Another compli-
cation which we can ignore for now is that the semantics does not generate interpretations for
all the outputs of syntax. A putative example of this is Chomsky’s colorless green ideas sleep
furiously (but see Camp [7] for rejection of the view that these sorts of sentences don’t have
a literal interpretation).
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that, given certain signals, outputs certain meanings (and vice-versa), thereby
computing English. For our purposes, we can remain neutral about the ‘nature’
of the representations used by I-languages, but in principle this framework can
be paired with a Chomskian internalist view (see e.g., Pietroski [53], [54]) or
with any of the externalist views more commonly adopted by philosophers and
formal semantic theorists (see e.g., Ludlow [44]).6
I-languages, as here defined, have three basic properties, crucial to debates
about the non/compositionality of FL: (i) they are idiolects, (ii) they have an
unbounded generative capacity; and (iii) some of their properties are innate.
I-languages are idiolects. In principle there can be as many distinct I-
languages and languages as there are individuals with a FL; or even more,
since on the way to its mature and stable state, each FL goes through various
developmental stages. However, general cognitive constraints, including some
particular to FL, together with general properties of language acquisition en-
vironments, reduce the differences between individual I-languages, at least to
the extent required for successful communication between speakers of what we
informally call a ‘linguistic community’.7 Here we are concerned with general
properties of I-languages, so we can ignore variations between the I-languages
of members of the same ‘linguistic community’, when compared at the same
stage of development. For example, we will assume that the community of what
we informally call ‘English speakers’ is a linguistically homogenous community,
so that ‘English’ captures (not perfectly) the set of <acoustic/visual signal,
meaning> pairs which members of this community use to communicate. Rela-
tive to this idealization, I-English is the cognitive computational structure that
an arbitrary competent speaker of this homogenous linguistic community uses
to compute English.
I-languages have an unbounded generative capacity. I-languages can assign
interpretations to an unbounded number of novel expressions, following the
patterns specified in P&S. For this reason, theorists studying languages often
define or describe (fragments of) them intensionally, rather than by listing their
<acoustic/visual signal, meaning> pairs. Different functions-in-intension can
define the same set of pairs, the same language, in which case we call them
‘extensionally equivalent’. It is sometimes said that if two or more functions-
in-intension are extensionally equivalent, the claim that one is the ‘correct’ one
doesn’t make sense. This is correct if we assume that the only task of a linguistic
theory is to describe or define a language; but incorrect if we assume that
part of the task of a linguistic theory is to discover (properties of) I-languages
(Chomsky [8]; Evans [20]; Davies [16]). We can discriminate between (at least
some) extensionally equivalent models on the grounds that one is, or seems to
6Various authors now use the term ‘I-language’ in the sense that I am proposing, i.e., as
an individual computational systems which process natural languages, but which are neutral
with respect to internal/external individuation. To capture this sense, Ludlow [44] introduced
the term ‘Ψ-language’. This discussion is indebted to his discussion of the small but important
distinction between ‘Ψ-languages’ and Chomsky’s ‘I-languages’.
7That idiolectical conceptions of language can be wedded to successful accounts of com-
munication has been shown by Larson and Segal [43] and Higginbotham [35].
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be, closer to the function actually computed by the I-language’s computational
processes. Whether a particular piece of psychological data can be used to make
this discrimination is usually controversial. Still, there is widespread agreement
that relevant evidence can come from data about patterns of language loss,
acquisition or revision, and from any neurological data that reveals properties
about the computational capacities or structure of the mind/brain.
Some properties of I-languages are innate. FL undergoes development from
an initial state prior to exposure to linguistic data, through various intermediate
states, to the ‘mature’ and stable state in which it incorporates I-languages that
can fully compute ‘natural languages’ such as English, Spanish, etc. ‘Mature’ I-
languages consist of certain semantic and syntactic rules and principles, some of
which have to be acquired in the course of linguistic development. For example,
speakers acquiring I-English have to acquire lexical rules such as JredK = red,
and syntactic principles such as that heads precede their complements and that
null subject sentences such as is raining are not allowed. Other rules and prin-
ciples, which do not seem to be learned in the course of language development,
are more plausibly seen as innate and often fixed properties of FL common to
all I-languages. Some candidates for innateness are the syntactic and semantic
primitives, the constraints that all syntactic principles are structure-depedent
and all syntactic branching is binary.
Precisely which rules and principles are innate, and which of these are unique
to FL, is a matter of ongoing debate between nativists who propose a substantial
base of innate and language-specific structures (e.g. Berwick et al. [64], Baker
[2]), empiricists who propose a minimal base of innate and no language-specific
structures (e.g. Elman et al. [19], Pullum and Scholz [60], Perfors et al. [51]),
and theorists who defend mixed or intermediate positions (e.g., Xu [85]). But
what is not controversial—and what we will assume—is that FL has some
innate structure, common to all I-languages, except those affected by unusual
genetic or developmental conditions. If we drop this assumption, it is impossible
to explain how FL can represent and interact with linguistic data to begin to
develop into a mature I-language.8
To close this brief presentation of our operating conception of FL, I should
add that I will not assume that FL is an informationally encapsulated cognitive
module. This is important because some advocates of compositionality assume
8There is a heated debate about the learning mechanisms used in language acquisition.
Linguists tend to emphasize that acquiring an I-language, as Szabo [77] puts it, ‘requires little
or no explicit instruction’, follows a certain developmental sequence, and ‘tends to yield a
remarkably uniform level of competence’. This suggests that, for the most part, acquiring
an I-language is quite unlike learning social conventions (Szabo [77]) or scientific theories
(Chomsky [13]). Unlike knowledge of a scientific theory, speakers are not conscious of—and
if prompt cannot state—most of the rules and principles which they ‘acquire’ as part of their
I-languages. When ‘acquiring’ most rules and principles, speakers do not seem to make the
sorts of mistakes they would make if they were constantly testing reasonable but incorrect
‘hypotheses’ against language data. However, some developmental psychologists disagree with
this picture and argue that language acquisition essentially relies on our innate, but domain
general, ‘science forming’ mechanisms (e.g., Gopnik [30]). As will become clear, the argument
we present for the compositionally of FL does not assume any one of these competing views
on the nature of the language learning mechanisms.
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that FL is informationally encapsulated, and then appeal to this property to
defend its compositionality (see e.g. Borg [6] and Larson and Segal [43]). Critics
are justifiably skeptical of this way of defending compositionality (Robbins [68];
Jonsson [39]: chap. 6). I-languages exhibit some degree of modularity—they
are domain specific, have mandatory operations which are (for the most part)
fast, have limited central accessibility, and characteristic patterns of breakdown
and development. If to account for these features of I-languages we assume their
(almost) total informational encapsulation, we move towards the view that they
are likely compositional. For most non-compositional accounts require that, to
determine the meanings of complex expressions, the semantics have access to
some subset of non-linguistic information. However, as most theorists rightly
point out, modularity comes in degrees. Even if we can hold that FL is modular
to some non-trivial degree, there is currently no good reason to assume that it
is informationally encapsulated to the degree that would be required to make it
incompatible with most reasonable non-compositional accounts (Robbins [68]).
3 Compositionality as a functional constraint of
the Faculty of Language
In our framework, to say that FL is compositional is to say that there is a
particular constraint on the way in which it generates the meanings of com-
plex expressions: the algorithms which generate semantic interpretations for
complex expressions can only use semantic information provided by their im-
mediate constituents and information about their combinatorial structure. This
does not tell us, for a particular type of complex expression (e.g., [NPA N ]),
what particular algorithm determines its meaning; it only tells us that the
algorithm computes a compositional function. We will call general semantic
constraints (such as compositionality and other competing constraints) which
range over all types of complex expressions, ‘meaning-determination constraints’
(MDCs). MDCs should be distinguished from particular ‘semantic rules’ (SRs)
which determine the meanings of particular types of complex expressions (e.g.,J[NPA N ]K = fNP (JAK, JNK)). MDCs range over and constraint the general
form of particular SRs.
This distinction between MDCs and SRs raises an important question which
has been neither sufficiently nor adequately raised in the literature. Should we
think of compositionality as a principle that we learn when we acquire some
I-language (so that we could have acquired a different MDC)? Or should we
think of it more like an innate and fixed property of FL, hence present in all
I-languages? The latter option is closer to the way in which I suggest we should
understand compositionality and other competing, non-compositional MDCs.
Specifically, we should understand MDCs as constraints on what, following
Pylyshyn [62], we’ll call the ‘functional architecture’ of the semantics of FL.
We can understand the notion of ‘functional architecture’ by analogy to the
way in which it is used in computer science (Dawson [17]; Pylyshyn [62], [63]).
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The functional architecture of a computational system M is the fundamental
programming language used to write the algorithms that M computes. This
programming language is fundamental in the sense that its primitive operations
or functions must be built into the (possibly virtual) machine M. Similarly,
the functional architecture of a cognitive computational system C (e.g., an I-
language) is something like the basic set of representations and operations avail-
able to C. The particular rules and algorithms which can be represented and
computed by C are those which can be defined in terms of C s basic program-
ming language. So if we specify C s functional architecture we thereby implicitly
specify C s cognitive capacity, i.e., the set of cognitive rules and algorithms
which can be represented and processed by C. A ‘functional constraint’ on C is
a way of (partially) specifying C s functional architecture, hence (implicitly) C s
cognitive capacity.
To further clarify this notion, consider a rule which is clearly not a functional
constraint, e.g., the lexical semantic rule JredK = red. This rule might be part
of some I-languages—e.g., I-English—but it is obviously not a functional con-
straint. Firstly, particular lexical rules are optional features of I-languages. In
certain conditions, FL can acquire the rule JredK = red; but in other conditions,
FL can acquire different rules for JredK, e.g., JredK = blue, or JredK = angry.
Secondly, the processes of learning lexical rules such as JredK = red can
be usefully understood as a rational learning process in which different hy-
potheses about the meaning of red (e.g., JredK = red, JredK = maroon,JredK = dark orange) can be tested and rejected or accepted. Thirdly, ac-
quired in roughly this way, FL must be capable of explicitly representing the
contents of lexical rules.
Functional constraints are fundamentally unlike such optional and rationally
acquired cognitive rules. Functional constraints specify the fixed representa-
tional and computational capacity of a cognitive system, i.e., the basic repre-
sentations and operations used by the system. Hence functional constraints (i)
are not acquired via cognitive processes (esp., via processes that can be properly
modeled as inferential, or more broadly rational, responses to information), and
(ii) we need not assume that they are explicitly represented by cognitive sys-
tems. A good example of a functional constraint is the putative informational
encapsulation of some modular cognitive systems. A module M is not infor-
mationally encapsulated because M learned a rule which specifies that, in its
computational operations, M should not use information from other cognitive
systems. Rather, M ’s informational encapsulation is explained by a constraint
on its fixed functional architecture: M is implemented in a way that blocks
operations of information exchange with other cognitive systems. M ’s inter-
modular information restriction is a constraint on M ’s cognitive capacity; it is
not something M can cognitively learn or alter.
MDCs are more like constraints on the exchange of information between
some cognitive modules than like optional lexical rules such as JredK = red. At
no point in language development does it seem that speakers are trying or have
to learn a general rule or principle which, like compositionality, structurally
constrains the kind of information which their I-languages can use to deter-
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mine the meanings of different types of complex expressions (see §6 below).
Furthermore, it does not seem possible to specify a counterfactual acquisition
scenario in which speakers would acquire, for cognitive/rational reasons, a dif-
ferent MDC. This suggests that the claim that FL or I-languages satisfy some
particular MDC should be understood as a proposal about how to constraint
the functional architecture of the semantics of FL.
Taking MDCs as functional constraints ties each competing proposal to a
set of characteristic consequences for language acquisition. The reason for this
should be clear. To specify the functional architecture of a cognitive system is to
implicitly specify the system’s cognitive capacity, i.e., the set of cognitive rules
and algorithms which the system can represent and process. To hold that FL is
constrained by a compositional MDC entails that FL is not cognitively capable
of instantiating, hence of acquiring, I-languages with non-compositional SRs. In
contrast, to hold that FL is constrained by a non-compositional MDC entails
that FL is cognitively capable of acquiring I-languages with compositional and
non-compositional SRs. These differences in the SRs they can ‘see’ determine
the consequences for acquisition of the competing MDCs.
For example, assume that the FL1 of speaker S1 has compositional MDC
M1, that the FL2 of speaker S2 has non-compositional MDC M2, and that S1
and S2 are beginning the process of acquiring I-language L, compatible with
both M1 and M2. S2 has to consider a hypothesis space that includes both
compositional and noncompositional SRs. This difference should be manifest in
at least slightly different patterns of linguistic development (e.g., in the sorts of
mistakes they could make), even if S1 and S2 eventually converge at L. Hence
even if both M1 and M2 can explain P&S (in the sense that all I-languages
compatible with either MDC satisfy P&S) and are compatible with L (in the
sense that under certain conditions both speakers could eventually acquire L),
we can still prefer one MDC if it predicts patters of development which better
fit or explain the course of actual linguistic development. In what follows, I will
argue that this is the reason why compositionality is more plausible than the
non-compositional MDCs.
4 Compositionality as a MDC
This section presents the notion of compositionality I will defend. The next
section present the non-compositional MDCs. To clearly state and compare
the competing MDCs, I will use the following terminology:
• A ‘lexical rule’ is an expression of the form ‘JxK = m’, where x ranges
over particular expressions, e.g., ‘JdogK = dog’ and ‘Jbrown dogK =
brown dog’.
• A ‘semantic rule’ (SR) is an expression of the form ‘J[ZX Y ]K = m’,
where ‘[ZX Y ]’ stands for any arbitrary type of syntactic structure (e.g.,
[NPA N ]), including the most general one, where Z is any branching node
with {X, Y} as its immediate constituents.
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Compositionality, interpreted as a MDC, amounts to the following constraint:
(CO) If L is an I-language which FL can represent, then:
1. L cannot use lexical rules to determine the meanings of complex
expressions.
2. Each SR in L is of the form ‘J[ZX Y ]K = fZ(JXK, JY K)’, were ‘fZ ’ is
a humanly computable function defined on the set of meanings.
Condition 1 of CO excludes all I-languages which assign meanings to syntacti-
cally complex expressions in a list-like way. To see why this condition should
be part of any adequate MDC, including non-compositional ones, consider the
consequences for acquisition of dropping it. FLs with MDCs without condition
1 would have to consider, for any particular complex expression, if its meaning
is determined through a lexical rule. For example, assume S knows, JbrownK,JdogK, and J[NPA N ]K = fNP (JAK, JNK). If S’s FL has a MDC without condi-
tion 1, S would still have to consider (without triggering from any special feature
of the learning data, e.g., repetition) whether J[NP [Abrown][Ndog]K is not given
by any of a set of lexical rules, which yield not J[NP [Abrown][Ndog]K = brown
dog, but rather J[NP [Abrown][Ndog]K = angry brown dog or lame brown
dog or any other direct meaning assignment consistent with the learning data.
This cognitive ‘flexibility’ substantially complicates language acquisition and
predicts patterns of linguistic development which we never find.9
Condition 2 guarantees that all I-languages compatible with CO assign
meanings to complex expressions through SRs that have access only to the
9As will become clear, condition 1 is not the point of contention between CO and the
non-compositional MDCs; but one might still object to it on the grounds that it seems
incompatible with idioms. Explaining idioms is everyone’s problem, but some influential
recent accounts are consistent with and even support condition 1. Idioms are ambiguous
expressions: they have a literal phrasal and a idiomatic meaning. The literal meaning of e.g.
kick the bucket is kick the bucket, and its idiomatic meaning is to die. There is substantial
evidence that the literal meaning of idioms is automatically processed in parallel with their
idiomatic meaning (Tabossi [79], Glucksberg [25]). This suggests, as predicted by condition
1, that I-languages are constrained to determine the literal meaning of complex expressions,
even idiomatic ones, via SRs. To explain how the idiomatic meaning of idioms is determined,
we have to make a distinction between two types of idioms, based on their syntactic flexibility.
Some idioms are syntactically inflexible (except for negation) and behave like words, e.g., by
and large. There is evidence that the idiomatic meaning of syntactically inflexible idioms is
computed directly, as syntactically simple expressions (Glucksberg [25]); so their meaning is
determined, consistently with condition 1, in a list-like way via lexical rules. Other idioms are
syntactically flexible and behave like phrases, e.g., spill the beans can be used as the terrorist
didn’t spill a single bean during the interrogation, or as John was weak, he spilled all the beans
during the interrogation. There is also evidence that the idiomatic meaning of syntactically
flexible idioms is computed in the ordinary compositional way, except that their simple parts
are polysemous or ambiguous and, in the idiomatic context, take on the relevant idiomatic
meaning (McGlone, Glucksberg, and Cacciari [45]). The idea is that most mature English
speakers know, e.g., not only that spill means fall from container and beans means edible
legumes, but also that in some special (idiomatic) contexts they can also mean, respectively,
reveal and secrets. The assumption that parts of the idiomatic phrase correspond to parts
of the idiomatic meaning explains why flexible idioms can be internally modified (Nunberg et
al. [47]), as in the investigator spilled some of the beans or the suspect quickly spilled all the
beans, with predictable and systematic changes to the meaning of the idiomatic phrase.
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(syntactic) mode of composition of expressions and the meanings of their im-
mediate constituents. If we hold CO, conditions 1 and 2 hold in general—i.e.,
of all I-languages which FL is cognitively capable of instantiating. This ensures
that CO provides an adequate structural explanation of P&S.
To further clarify CO let us consider its relation to the syntax and pragmat-
ics interfaces, beginning with the former. CO is compatible with a “strongish”
compositional view, in the sense of Jacobson [37]. According to this view,
the syntax and the semantics work in tandem: there is no intermediate level
(such as the LF of early transformational grammars) that is first built from
surface structures—using syntactic operations that have no corresponding se-
mantic operations—and serves as input to the semantics. All the CO com-
patible solutions to problematic expressions that I discuss later in the paper
respect strongish compositionally, but my arguments for CO are compatible
with weaker views on Jacobson’s scale, e.g., a view according to which there
are some syntactic operations (with no corresponding semantic operations) that
create LF structures from surface structures. As will become clear, the debate
about whether we can hold on to strongish compositionality (which depends
on issues like whether we need quantifier/auxiliary raising rules), is indepen-
dent of the debate between compositional and non-compositional MDCs as I
frame it here, and would still arise, mutatis mutandis, even if we hold a non-
compositional MDC.
Another important issue at the syntax interface concerns the relation be-
tween syntactic rules and types of SRs. Some Montague-style theories use
particular phrase-structure rules such as S → NP V P and pair them with
construction-specific compositional SR such as (1):
(1) J[SNP V P ]K = fS(JNP K, JV P K)
where ‘fS ’ is a function which given JNP K and JV P K, outputs JSK. As stated,
CO is compatible with those views; but we will make a stronger assumption,
namely, that CO requires general, not construction-specific, SRs. So we will
assume that, in the formulation of CO above, Z stands for any branching node
with {X,Y } as its immediate constituents. This is in any case how we would
have to interpret CO if it is paired with a syntactic theory, such as Minimalism,
that does not have category-specific phrase-structure rules. A famous theory
along these lines is the type-driven theory presented in Heim and Kratzer [34].
Type-driven theories do not require category-specific syntactic phrase-structure
rules. Heim and Kratzer assume that the syntax delivers to the semantics
bare-phrase structures. Translated into our terminology, this means that the
semantics sees only the most general type of syntactic structure, a branching
node and its immediate constituents. Given this assumption about what the
syntax delivers to the semantics, CO entails that the SRs have to be general,
ranging over all (types of) complex expressions (including NP s, V P s, Ss, etc.).
An example of a general SRs is Functional Application (FA):
(FA) If α is a branching node, {β, γ} is the set of α’s daughters, and JβK is a
function whose domain contains JγK, then JαK = JβK(JγK)
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However, CO is compatible with various accounts of how the compositional
operations work, i.e., of the nature of the general SRs. According to recent
Neo-Davidsonian accounts, composition is a uniform operation such as predi-
cate conjunction over monadic concepts (Pietroski [55]). Other linguists, closer
to Montague’s original framework, use rules such as FA, predicate modifica-
tion, and various type-shifting rules (Jacobson [37], Heim and Kratzer [34]).
The important point, for our purposes, is that we could state the whole dialec-
tic between compositional and non-compositional MDCs by assuming either
view.10
Consider now the interface with pragmatics. CO is compatible with at least
two kinds of context-sensitivity. Firstly, CO allows the meaning of some, most,
or all lexical items to be characters. We can represent this by saying that, for
any expression e:
• JeKc = fe(c)
where fe is the character of e and fe(c) is the occasion meaning of e in c. If
e has no free parameters, then for all c’s, fe(c) = m, where m is the standing
meaning of e. Secondly, CO allows SRs to take the modulated (instead of
the standing or occasion) meanings of the immediate constituents of complex
expressions. Following Recanati [67], we can represent the modulated meanings
of an expression e, JeKM,c, as follows:
• JeKM,c = mod(e, c)(JeKc)
mod takes as an argument an expression e and context c in which e occurs and
returns as value the modulation function fM,e, which takes JeKc and returns the
meaning that is salient/relevant/appropriate for e in c.
There are two main ways of implementing the context-sensitive mod func-
tion to get general SRs that determine the meanings of complex expressions in
terms of the modulated instead of the standing or occasion meanings of their
constituents. On an unconstrained view, mod is generalized to apply at every
level of interpretation. On a constrained view, which is the one we will adopt
here, mod applies only on lexical items. To illustrate, let us implement this
constrained version of mod in a type-driven framework. Focusing again on FA,
our interpretation should be formulated as follows (assume for brevity that all
non-branching nodes are terminal nodes):
(TNM ) If α is a terminal node, then JαKM,c = mod(α, c)(JαKc), where JαKc is
specified in the lexicon.
(FAM ) If α is a branching node, {β, γ} is the set of α’s daughters, andJβKM,c1 is a function whose domain contains JγKM,c2 , then JαKM,c =JβKM,c1(JγKM,c2)
10This is not to deny, of course, that the outcome of this debate affects the interpretation
of CO. For example, neo-Davidsonians often avoid type-shifting rules by positing covert
syntactic elements (see e.g. Pietroski’s account of proper names in [55]); so assuming that
composition is predicate conjunction might entail that we abandon strongish compositionality.
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On this account, mod does not operate on the outputs of FAM (or other rules
for interpreting the meaning of complex expressions), but only on terminal
nodes/lexical items. This allows a constrained form of meaning modulation.
Since the compositional step (i.e., the determination of the meaning of complex
expressions), in this sort of framework, corresponds to the FAM rule, we can
say that meaning modulation is pre-compositional.
Pragmatic processes also modify the outputs of the semantics, but there is
no good reason to model post-compositional pragmatic processes as part of FL.
Many linguists now think that syntactic/semantic computations work in phases
that are sent off for pragmatic interpretation before full sentences or clauses are
processed by FL. In Minimalist theories, the main phases are vP s and CP s,
but due to the ‘left edge condition’ (Chomsky [11, 12]), the phases that are
sent out for pragmatic processing are more fine grained (Cook and Newson [14],
Radford [65]). Theorists who adopt Categorical Grammars also usually assume
that the outputs to pragmatics are sub-sentential phrases (Jacobson [37]). If
interpretation proceeds in such phases, which are inputs to (primary) pragmatic
processes, then there is no reason why we should incorporate into the semantics
a generalized version of mod, i.e., a function which modulates both the inputs
and outputs of the compositional operations. Such output modulations would
be redundant; indeed, in actual case studies (as in the CO compatible accounts
we present below), most of the modulation operations operate on lexical items.
To conclude, let me emphasize the most important consequences, for this
discussion, of interpreting CO as excluding construction-specific SRs. Firstly,
assuming that FL can only represent general SRs has the advantage of sub-
stantially diminishing the amount of rules which we have to assume speakers
either acquire or innately possess. Secondly, that assumption also coheres nicely
with an important current trend in generative linguistics, namely, to generalize
or eliminate phrase-structure rules (see Chomsky [8]; Heim and Kratzer [34]).
But most importantly, assuming that FL cannot represent construction-specific
SRs has distinctive empirical consequences for language acquisition and develop-
ment. For example, Heim and Kratzer’s type-driven theory entails that speakers
need not acquire or innately posses a construction-specific SR like (1) for each
type of syntactic construction. If speakers know, about a complex expression,
(i) the meanings of its parts and (ii) its structure, this theory predicts that
they should have the linguistic competence to adequately determine its mean-
ing. In other words, once they know (i) and (ii), there is no space for speakers
to make a mistake that leads to an incorrect understanding of a complex ex-
pression. Non-compositional theories make different predictions about the sorts
of mistakes speakers can make. For as we will now see, each non-compositional
MDC has to assume that speakers can acquire construction-specific SRs. This
entails that, despite knowing (i) and (ii), speakers could, early in development,
systematically assign incorrect meanings to tokens of certain types of complex
expressions, for they could assign an incorrect construction-specific SR to any
type of complex expression.
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5 CO vs Non-compositional MDCs
The claim we will defend is that assuming a MDC approximately like CO is
currently the best explanation of P&S. CO seems correct insofar as it requires
that the meaning of complex expressions be determined via SRs. But we might
suspect that CO is too restrictive insofar as it requires that SRs determine
the meaning of complex expressions only from information derived from their
immediate constituents and their structure.
Szabo [78] eloquently elaborates this suspicion. The fact that S, an arbitrary
competent speaker of English, understands some token of a novel complex ex-
pression e shows only that the information necessary to determine e’s meaning
is available to S in the context and information state in which S processed e.
Part of the information S has in this state is information about e’s structure
and about the meaning of its constituents. But as Szabo reminds us, S also has
access to other information—e.g., other linguistic information, general features
of the context and certain general beliefs. This information may partly deter-
mine the meaning of tokens of e and other complex expressions, in which case
structural and constituent information is not generally sufficient to determine
the meaning of complex expressions. Since the opposite is assumed by CO, we
might conclude that we should replace CO with a ‘weaker’ MDC compatible
with the possibility that there is a set of non-constituent-derived but generally
available information which partly determines the meaning of certain types of
complex expressions.
This suspicion against CO derives most of its initial plausibility from its
generality. To show this, we will now examine particular proposals for types of
information that could, via non-compositional SRs, partly determine the mean-
ing of certain types of complex expressions. The non-compositional proposals
most commonly presented appeal to certain types of (i) contextual informa-
tion and (ii) general beliefs. From our perspective, the often overlooked point
to note is that to allow information of type (i)-(ii) to partly determine, via
non-compositional SRs, the meanings of certain types of complex expressions,
we have to assume, in each case, that the MDC of FL weakens condition 2
of CO to allow the desired non-compositional SRs.11 However, in doing that
each non-compositional MDC is also made compatible with many other (unin-
tended) SRs. As a result, unlike CO, each non-compositional MDC predicts
patterns of early linguistic development that seem obviously incorrect.
5.1 Non-compositional MDCs which use contextual infor-
mation
The first proposal we will consider is to replace CO with a MDC which al-
lows non-constituent contextual information to partly determine the meaning
11There are various reasons why this is often overlooked. One is that critics often focus
only on a particular type of complex expression, and on SRs for that type of expression, and
fail to consider the general consequences of adopting a non-compositional MDC that is weak
enough to permit the particular SR they are considering.
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of (certain types of) complex expressions. The motivation for adopting this non-
compositional MDC is that there seem to be complex expressions with ‘unar-
ticulated semantic constituents’: their meaning is determined by the meanings
of their parts, their structure, and certain contextual information which is not
the meaning of any of its constituents.
The paradigmatic examples of expressions with ‘unarticulated constituents’
are simple ‘meteorological expressions’ like:
(2) It is raining.
In most contexts, tokens of (2) seem to express the proposition that it is raining
at a certain time and place. One can hold that the relevant time is signified
by the tense of the auxiliary verb, so that the time is represented at LF . But
it seems that no constituent of (2) signifies or indexically encodes the relevant
place. At the same time, it seems that competent speakers who understand
the parts of (2) can understand (2), i.e., it seems that competent speakers can
productively and systematically arrive at these interpretations. This suggests
that: (i) the proposition expressed by (2) includes information of a location, and
(ii) this information is not determined by either the structure or the constituents
of (2). According to this account, then, the meaning of simple meteorological
expressions like (2) is not determined compositionally.
Note that unlike the unarticulated constituency account just sketched, most
accounts of the meaning of meteorological expressions respect CO. For example,
Borg [6] argues that at LF (2) has a time but not a location variable; but she
denies that the proposition literally expressed by (2) has a location specification.
Recanati [66] defends an account similar to Borg’s: (2) can be used to assert
a proposition that is indefinite with respect to location, which suggests that
location definite uses of (2) involve primary pragmatic enrichments.
Since there are CO compatible accounts of simple meteorological expres-
sions, why replace CO with a MDC that allows non-compositional accounts of
meteorological expressions? The issue in this discussion is not whether there are
accounts of meteorological expressions compatible with CO; the issue is whether
we should take CO as the MDC of FL. We might question this if adopting
CO forces us, a priori, to dismiss otherwise plausible accounts of the meaning
of certain types of complex expressions, such as the unarticulated constituency
account of simple meteorological expressions. It seems preferable to adopt a
MDC which allows both compositional and non-compositional SRs.
Basically for these reasons, Jonsson [39] argues that we could replace CO
with LOC, which we here reformulate as a MDC:
(LOC) If L is an I-language which FL can represent, then:
1. L cannot use lexical rules to determine the meanings of complex
expressions.
2. Each SR in L is of form (a) or (b):
(a) ‘J[ZX Y ]K = fZ(JXK, JY K)’, where ‘fZ ’ stands for a humanly
computable function defined on the set of meanings
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(b) ‘J[ZX Y ]K = fZ′(JXK, JY K, g)’ where ‘g’ stands for a location
function (functions from contexts to places) and ‘fZ′ ’ stands for
a humanly computable function defined on the set of meanings
and location functions.
LOC is weaker than CO in the sense that condition 2 allows, on the right-hand
side of SRs, reference to location functions which are not the meaning of a
constituent of the complex expressions whose meaning they determine.12 This
opens space for unarticulated constituency accounts of simple meteorological
expressions, via construction-specific SRs. To illustrate, assume that (2) has
the following simple structure:13
(2) [S [E It][V P [Aux is][V raining]]
The unarticulated location function could be introduced, via a construction-
specific non-compositional SR, at the level of the S or V P . For our purposes
this choice does not matter, but assume it is introduced at the level of the V P :
(3) J[V PAux V ]K = fV P ′(JAuxK, JV K, g1)
Rule (3) contains the function g1, a location function which is not the meaning
of any of the constituents of the left-hand side of the rule.
As Jonsson [39] argues, adopting LOC does not affect the explanation of
P&S. Firstly, LOC, like CO, prohibits lexical rules to determine the meaning
of complex expressions. Secondly, the sorts of unarticulated meanings which
LOC allows—i.e., location functions from contexts to places—are constituted
by information which speakers generally have access to, and there is no reason to
deny that FL can access this kind of contextual information. For these reasons,
we might be tempted to conclude that the non-compositional LOC is a better
choice of MDC than CO.
However, LOC entails that speakers have to face certain choices in language
acquisition that, judging from the general patterns of early linguistic develop-
ment, speakers never seem to face.
To see that, note, first, that if we assume LOC, then to generate English
(using non-compositional SRs) speakers would have to acquire an I-language
with construction-specific SRs such as (3), and not one with general SRs such
as FA. For only in the case of some types of complex expressions—e.g., me-
teorological expressions—is it plausible to assume that unarticulated location
functions partly determine their meanings. For example, the meanings of most
NP s of the form [NPA N ]—black cat, angry cow, pretty dolphin, etc.—do
12As stated, LOC is logically weaker than CO: every I-language compatible with CO is
compatible with LOC but not vice-versa. However, I do not emphasize this because we can
impose additional constraints on LOC (some of which we will discuss below) which entail
that there is no logical strength ordering between LOC and CO. For our purposes what
is crucial is only that LOC has to weaken condition 2 of CO to allow the desired type of
non-compositional SRs.
13This structure is obviously not the one that would be assigned by a serious syntactic
theory. For a more realistic structure, see footnote 14. However, none of the points I will
make depend on the particular structure assigned to simple meteorological expressions.
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not include an unarticulated constituent that, given a context, determines a
location. The same is true of most Ss, e.g., John is thinking, Einstein’s idea
is fantastic, Empiricism is dead, etc. Indeed, even construction-specific SRs
like (3) would need to be reformulated in terms of more fine-grained syntactic
categories, for (3) incorrectly assigns a location specification to all tensed V P s
with the syntactic structure [V P Aux V ], e.g., is thinking and is happy.
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if we accept LOC, speakers would have to either acquire or innately posses
(fine-grained) construction-specific SRs.
Consider the first option, that construction-specific SRs (a fortiori, phrase-
structure rules) are innate. If we take this option, we would have to attribute
substantially more innate knowledge to speakers than if we adopted CO, while
gaining no descriptive coverage. In any case, this option is empirically implau-
sible. Assuming a syntax that uses phrase-structure rules, there is substantial
cross-linguistic evidence that at least some of these rules have to be acquired
(Roeper [69]). For example, compounds are recursive in Germanic languages
but not in Romance languages. Possessives are recursive in English but not in
German. Prenominal As are recursive in English but not in French, and the op-
posite holds for post-nominal As. There are plenty of other examples like this.
If phrase-structure rules have to be acquired, then the construction-specific SRs
for such rules cannot plausibly be innate. So assuming that construction-specific
SRs are innate is not a viable option for defenders of LOC.
The other option is to assume that construction-specific SRs are learned or
acquired. In itself, this is not a problem. Assume that S knows (i) that ‘γ β’
is an expression of the form [V PAux V ], and (ii) Jγ βK, JγK, and JβK. For S to
acquire a rule like (3) from (i) and (ii), we have to assume that S is able to use
information (i) and (ii) to test hypotheses like (6) and (7):
(6) Jγ βK = fV P ′(JγK, JβK, g1)
14This point does not depend on assuming that simple meteorological expressions have that
structure: regardless of the particular syntactic structure we assign to simple meteorological
expressions, there are other expressions which are syntactically identical at the level of struc-
ture where the non-compositional rule applies, but which do not have a location specification.
For example, assume that simple meteorological expressions have the syntactic structure they
are assigned in most P&P syntactic theories: [TP [[PRN ] [T¯ [T V P ]]]] (see Radford [65]).
The non-constituent contextual function g could be introduced at the level of the complex
TP , via an SR for [TPPRN T¯ ], or at the level of the complex T¯ , via an SR for [T¯T V P ]. As
a result, expressions like he is thinking, he is depressed, it is said that life is short, it is sad
to think about suffering would be incorrectly assigned a location specification.
To avoid this problem of implausibly over-saturating all sorts of complex expressions with
unarticulated location specifications, the SRs acquired by LOC constrained FLs have to
use construction-specific SRs with fine-grained syntactic categories. For example, to give
an unarticulated constituency account of expressions like it is raining in a way that doesn’t
over-saturate with location specifications the meanings of similarly structured sentences, we
can include a new category for a subset of verbs, call it Ve. Assume Ve includes verbs of
physical events like snows and rains, but not verbs of mental events or states like loves
and thinks. A model which includes fine-grained category Ve/V Pe can include fine-grained
construction-specific SRs like (4)-(5):
(4) J[V PeAux Ve]K = fV P ′ (JVeK, JAuxK, g1)
(5) J[T¯e T V Pe]K = fT¯e (JT K, JV PeK, g1)
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(7) Jγ βK = fV P (JγK, JβK)
If (7) fits the data, S assumes that Jγ βK is determined from its parts using
compositional rule (8):
(8) J[V PAux V ]K = fV P (JAuxK, JV K)
If (6) fits the data, S assumes that Jγ βK is determined from its parts using
non-compositional rule (3), here repeated:
(3) J[V PAux V ]K = fV P ′(JAuxK, JV K, g1)
Suppose that S concludes that hypothesis (6) fits the data better than hypothesis
(7), then S can generalize to all structures of the form [V PAux V ] and so acquire
non-compositional SR (3).
Note, however, that if we replace CO with LOC analogous learning proce-
dures enter each case of acquiring a construction-specific SR. For unlike CO,
LOC allows the general possibility that construction-specific non-compositional
SRs determine the meaning of every syntactic type of complex expression. As-
suming only LOC, each time S acquires a construction-specific SR, S would
be open to consider compositional and non-compositional alternatives. For ex-
ample, assume that (9)-(10) are correct SRs, in the sense that they output
the correct meaning-assignments, relative to English. En route to acquiring
(9)-(10), S is cognitively ‘open’ to consider a hypotheses space like (9*)-(10*),
where each gi stands for a location function:
(9) J[SNP V P ]K = fS(JNP K, JV P K)
(10) J[NPAP NP ]K = fNP (JAP K, JNP K)
(9*) J[SNP V P ]K = fS(JNP K, JV P K) or fS′(JNP K, JV P K, g1/g2/.../gn)
(10*) J[NPAP NP ]K = fNP (JAP K, JNP K) or fNP ′(JAP K, JNP K, g1/g2/.../gn)
This entails that, at some early stage in the acquisition of I-English, S could
make mistakes like (11)-(13), even if eventually S ends up acquiring the correct
SRs (9)-(10) (in the examples below, assume that S knows the relevant syntax
and the correct meanings for the lexical items, relative to I-English).
(11) J[SmsNP V Pms]K = fS′(JNP K, JV PmsK, g1/.../gn), where ‘V Pms’ is a
subcategory of V P s headed by V s of mental states. So S takesJJohn is happyK to be john is happy here/close to
home/everywhere/... (note that LOC allows location functions other
than g1), JMary is sadK to be mary is sad here/ close to
home/everywhere/... and so on.
(12) J[SmtNP V Pmt]K = fS′(JNP K, JV PmtK, g1/.../gn), where ‘V Pmt’ is a
subcategory of V P s headed by V s of mental traits. So S takesJJohn is sillyK to be john is silly here/close to
home/everywhere/..., JMary is courageousK to be mary is
courageous here/close to home/everywhere/..., and so on.
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(13) J[NPcAPc NP )K = fNP ′(JAPcK, JNP K, g10/.../gn), where ‘APc’ is a
subcategory of AP s headed by color As. So S takes Jgray sharkK to be
gray shark when under water/when I see it/when outside
water/..., Jred fishK to be red fish when under water/when I
see it/when outside water/..., and so on.
The meaning assignments in (11)-(13) are consistent with the learning-data
encountered by most speakers during early language acquisition. For example,
S can reasonably assume that color As, when combined with common Ns, re-
sult in color attributions that have location restrictions, resulting in cases like
(13). The non-obvious mistakes in (13) would take time to correct, since the
location-restricted assertion-conditions of each color A and common N complex
expression is a commonly used subset of their (mature English) non-location
restricted assertion-conditions. However, speakers do not make mistakes about
the meaning of color A and common N compounds analogous to those pre-
sented in (13). Similarly, S can reasonably assume that expressions which
attribute mental states or traits are location restricted, like (11)-(12). The
non-obvious mistakes in (11)-(12) would also take time to correct, since the
location-restricted assertion-conditions of each expression attributing a mental
state is a commonly used subset of their (English) non-location restricted asser-
tion conditions. However, speakers do not make mistakes about the meanings
of expressions attributing mental states or traits analogous to (11)-(12).
That speakers, even early in development, never go through states like (11)-
(13) suggests that they never consider a hypothesis space like (9*)-(10*), i.e.,
a hypothesis space which includes, for each type of complex expression, a set
of possible non-compositional SRs, each involving some unarticulated location
function. However, this is the hypothesis space that would be open to speakers
if their MDC was LOC. So either we reject LOC, or it is a mystery why speak-
ers acquiring I-English never adopt or even consider ‘reasonable but mistaken’
construction-specific non-compositional SRs like those presented in (11)-(13).
To sum-up, although LOC does not undermine the explanation of P&S,
it seems to entail false predictions about patterns of early linguistic devel-
opment. LOC entails that language acquisition partly consists in acquiring
phrase-structure rules and construction-specific SRs. Each time speakers ac-
quire a construction-specific SR, they would be open to consider a whole set of
competing non-compositional SRs. Given the type of information encountered
in early language acquisition scenarios, the fact that speakers do not adopt, at
least temporarily, some reasonable but ‘incorrect’ non-compositional SRs is left
completely unexplained. In addition, replacing CO with LOC buys our linguis-
tic theories no additional descriptive coverage. For these reasons, CO is a more
plausible MDC than the weaker, non-compositional LOC.
5.2 Non-compositional MDCs which use general beliefs
Another recent and more influential proposal is to replace CO with a MDC that
allows general beliefs to partly determine the meanings I-languages assign to
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(certain) types of complex expressions (Prinz [59], Jonsson and Hampton [33]).
One reason to propose such a MDC is that there are complex expressions
that seem to have semantic features neither present in nor determined by the
semantic features of their constituents. For example, consider complex NP s
such as black cat and brown cow. For some speakers, Jblack catK seems to
include the information that their presence brings bad luck; and for othersJbrown cowK seems to include the information that brown cows produce bad
milk. To linguistically account for the ‘free-enrichment’ of complex NP s, some
theorists propose that we allow general beliefs about the extension of complex
NP s—usually called ‘extensional feedback’ beliefs—to partly determine their
meaning, even if such beliefs are not part of the meaning of their constituents
(Murphy [46], Prinz [58,59], Hampton [31], Jonsson and Hampton [33]). There
are other types of ‘free-enrichments’ of complex expressions, including NP s not
plausibly modeled as computations involving the use of extensional feedback.
For now we will focus on the extensional feedback class.
There are accounts of ‘free-enrichment’ complex NP s compatible with CO.
One proposal assumes that the meaning of tokens of common Ns is enriched on-
line to include some (relevant) encyclopedic information (Barsalou [3]; Carston
and Wilson [83]). According to this view, in some contexts, JcowK is enriched
to include information like ‘produces bad milk if brown’, JcatK to include infor-
mation like ‘brings bad luck if black’, etc. There is no a priori reason to reject
the claim that the meaning of some lexical items can be enriched online to in-
clude such information. Another proposal is to hold that the free-enrichments of
the meanings of complex NP s are post-linguistic pragmatic enrichments, even
if they are often sub-personal and automatic. The intuitive meanings of many
kinds of expressions are affected by pragmatic enrichments, which are often sub-
personal and automatic (Recanati [66]; Glucksberg [26]). There is no a priori
reason to reject the claim that such post-compositional processes account for
the ‘intuitive’ meanings of free-enrichment complex NP s.
Since there are CO compatible accounts of free enrichment complex NP s,
why replace CO with a MDC that allows non-compositional accounts of the
meanings of these complex NP s? Again, the issue in this discussion is not
whether there are CO compatible accounts of free-enrichment complex NP s; the
issue is whether we should take CO as the MDC of FL. We might question this
if adopting CO forces us, a priori, to dismiss apparently reasonable accounts
of the meaning of certain types of complex expressions, such as the extensional
feedback account of free-enrichment complex NP s.
To allow non-compositional accounts of free-enrichment complex NP s, Jon-
sson [39] proposes GEN , which we here reformulate as a MDC:
(GEN) If L is an I-language which FL can represent, then:
1. L cannot use lexical rules to determine the meanings of complex
expressions.
2. Each SR in L is of form (a) or (b):
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(a) ‘J[ZX Y ]K = fZ(JXK, JY K)’, where ‘fZ ’ stands for a humanly
computable function defined on the set of meanings
(b) ‘J[ZX Y ]K = fZ+(JXK, JY K, b)’ where ‘b’ stands for a set of gen-
eral beliefs and ‘fZ+’ stands for a humanly computable function
defined on the set of meanings and general beliefs.
GEN is weaker than CO in the sense that it allows, to partly determine the
meaning of complex expressions, general beliefs which are not part of the mean-
ing of their constituents.15 This opens space for non-compositional accounts
of free-enrichment complex NP s, including extensional feedback accounts, via
non-compositional SRs:
(14) J[NPA N ]K = fex(fNP (JAK, JNK), b)
(14) refers to the extensional feedback belief set b, which is not the meaning
of any of the constituents of the complex expressions whose meaning it partly
determines. According to (14), the meaning of complex NP s is a function fex
from the value of the ordinary compositional function fNP for NP s, which
applies to the meaning of its constituents, and from the extensional-feedback
belief set b. To illustrate fex, assume that b stands for S’s extensional feedback,
which includes the belief that black cats bring bad luck:
(15) fex(fNP (JblackK, JcatK), b) = black cat and brings bad luck
What fex does is to incorporate into the meaning of complex NP s, as composi-
tionally determined, whatever beliefs about the NP there are in the extensional
feedback belief set.
As Jonsson [39] argues, adopting GEN does not seem to affect the expla-
nation of P&S. Firstly, GEN , like CO, prohibits lexical rules for complex
expressions. Secondly, the beliefs which GEN allows to partly determine the
meaning of free-enrichment complex NP s are beliefs which speakers have ac-
cess to, at least at the personal level. If we assume that FL also has access
to these general beliefs—i.e., if we assume that FL is not an informationally
encapsulated module—I-languages constrained by GEN would satisfy P&S.
Why should we stick with CO, which blocks the possibility that speakers
can acquire I-languages with some non-compositional SRs like (14) to deal with
extensional feedback complex NP s, when we can, apparently without violating
P&S, adopt a weaker non-compositional MDC which allows that possibility?
The problem faced by GEN is quite similar to the problem faced by LOC.
Note, first, that SRs like (14) are actually problematic, relative to English. If
S’s I-language has (14), it follows that, if α is an expression of the form [NPA N ],
its meaning is partly determined by all of S’s extensional feedback beliefs about
15As stated, GEN is logically weaker than CO: all I-languages compatible with CO are
also compatible with GEN , but not vice-versa. However, what I said with respect to LOC
also applies in this case: what is crucial, for our purposes, is only that GEN has to weaken
condition 2 of CO to allow for the desired type of non-compositional SRs. This is compatible
with there being some additional constraints on GEN (some of which we discuss below) that
entail that there is no strict logical strength ordering between GEN and CO.
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the referent of α. For example, if S believes not only that black cats bring bad
luck, but also that cats are felines and felines are never underwater, that cats
are animals and that animals are robots controlled by Martians, then:
(16) fex(fNP (JblackK, JcatK), b) = black cat and brings bad luck and is
never under water and is a robot controlled by martians
However, whatever peculiar beliefs about cats, black cats, black animals, colored
animals, etc., S has, not all of them are part of Jblack catsK, as determined by
S’s I-language. Some theorists have defended the idea that beliefs about the
referent of an arbitrary complex expression can, in principle, affect the meaning
speakers assign to it; but with the exception of radical holists, no one defends
the view that all such beliefs affect the meaning speakers assign to it, as (14)
entails.16 Most theorists who assume that extensional feedback beliefs about the
entity denoted by a complex expression partly determine its meanings implicitly
assume that only some of those beliefs play such a role. Of course, GEN is
compatible with constrained versions of (14), such as (14+):
(14+) J[NPA N ]K = fex(fNP (JAK, JNK), b+)
(14+) is just like (14) except that the extensional belief set b+ is a subset of
the extensional belief set b. What subset? One option, assuming that we can
represent something like degrees of belief, is that b+ only includes extensional
feedback beliefs that pass a threshold. In this way, not all of S’s extensional
feedback beliefs about e.g. black cats would be included in the meaning which
S’s I-language assigns to black cat, but only the ones that S ‘really’ believes.
Still, although rule (14+) might work for cases like black cat and brown cow,
it is incorrect for English. For example, take gray shark and fierce lion, which
have the form [NPA N ], so that (14+) applies to both of them. Suppose again
that at some early stage of linguistic development, S ‘really’ believes that lions
are only fierce in their territory, and that color attributions to fish are restricted
to the way they look when underwater. In this case, rule (14+) would have
the result that Jfierce lionK is something like fierce lion in his territory,
and that Jgray sharkK is something like gray shark when underwater. In
short, just as in the case of LOC, if we adopt GEN , we have to assume that
speakers acquire construction-specific SRs which can use fine-grained syntactic
categories, such as the following:
(17) J[NPaAc Nt]K = fex(fNPa(JAcK, JNtK), b+)
16The most famous holist about linguistic meaning is probably Block [4]. However, I agree
with Block [5] that holistic inferential role theories of meaning are compositional. The reason
for this is simple. According to these theories, the meaning of an expression is given by all
of its inferential roles. Hence extensional feedback beliefs such as that black cats bring bad
luck are part of JcatK. From this perspective, to hold that extensional feedback beliefs are
incorporated into the meanings of tokens of complex expressions via non-compositional SRs
would be entirely superfluous, since they are already part of the meaning of the constituents.
For further discussion, see Szabo’s [75] response to Fodor and Lepore’s [23] claim that total
inferential roles are not compositional.
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‘NPa’ is a category of NP s formed out of color As and terrestrial animate
beings. In this case, (17) applies to brown cow and black cat, but not to fierce
lion and gray shark.
However, if we adopt GEN , S could, early in linguistic development, test
‘mistaken’ construction-specific SRs like (14) and (14+) for at least some types
of complex expressions, in cases in which they output reasonable but incorrect
meaning assignments. Consider the following examples (assume that S knows
the relevant syntax and the correct meanings for the lexical items, relative to
I-English):
(18) J[SmNP V Pm]K = fSm(fS(JNP K, JV PmK), b+), where ‘b+’ stands for the
set of highly weighted extensional feedback beliefs, and ‘Sm’ is a category
of Ss formed by a NP and a V Pm which predicates some mental trait.
In this case, if S assumes that attributions of mental traits are restricted
to certain locations, S would take JJohn is sillyK to be john is silly in
his house (or some other reasonable location restriction), and so on.
(19) J[NPmAm Nan]K = fNPm(fNP (JAmK, JNanK), b+), where ‘NPm’ is a
category of NP s formed by mental trait As and Ns that stand for
animate beings. In this case, if S believes that certain mental traits of
animate objects are restricted to certain locations, S would takeJfierce lionK to be something like fierce lion when in his
territory (or some other location restriction), Jsilly studentK to be
silly student when in his school (or some other reasonable location
restriction), and so on.
(20) J[NPpAm Nan]K = fNPp(fNP (JAmK, JNanK), b+), where ‘NPp’ is a
category of NP s formed by physical trait As and Ns that stand for
animate beings. In this case, if S believes that certain physical traits of
animate objects are strongly correlated with certain mental traits, S
could take Jstrong catK to be something like strong and mean cat,Jstrong studentK to be something like strong and bullying student,
and so on.
Again, we do not find patterns of early linguistic development in which speakers
test reasonable but incorrect SRs such as (18)-(20). This suggests that FL is not
as unconstrained as it would be if GEN was its MDC. Note, in addition, that
GEN faces basically the same problems faced by LOC. For if assuming GEN ,
speakers would have to test and eliminate reasonable but incorrect construction-
specific SRs which have the same output as those we considered in (11)-(13),
which we used to criticize LOC. To illustrate this, consider (12) again:
(12) J[SmtNP V Pmt]K = fS′(JNP K, JV PmtK, g1/.../gn), where ‘V Pmt’ is a
subcategory of V P s headed by V s of mental traits. So S takesJJohn is sillyK to be john is silly here/close to
home/everywhere/..., JMary is courageousK to be mary is
courageous here/close to home/everywhere/..., and so on.
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GEN does not allow SRs like the one used in (12), but it allows SRs that have,
under similar conditions, very similar outputs, as is illustrated by (18) and
(19). As we argued before, if the MDC of FL doesn’t exclude these options,
it would be ‘reasonable’, early in linguistic development, for S to believe that
assertions using certain types of complex expressions have location restrictions,
as in (11)-(13), even if these beliefs are eventually abandoned.
So GEN inherits most of the problems faced by LOC, and introduces some
of its own. If we hold that GEN is the MDC, we have to explain how speakers
acquire rules closer to (17) than to (14) or (14+), how they acquire something
like (9)-(10) from an initial hypotheses space that is much wider than (9*)-
(10*), and so on. But even if that can be explained, the crucial point is that
we should find, early in linguistic development, mistakes that reveal the use of
construction-specific SRs like (18)-(20), which result in various kinds of reason-
able but incorrect free-enrichments of certain types of complex expressions.
This objection to GEN is important because many critics of compositiona-
lity hold that what we should infer from P&S is only that FL respects some
weak constraint along the lines of GEN—a constraint which allows the mean-
ing of complex expressions to be compositionally determined, but also allows
the meaning of some types of complex expressions to be partly determined by
general beliefs (Murphy [46], Prinz [58, 59], Hampton and Jonsson [33]). But if
we change our perspective and take MDCs not as convenient methodological
assumptions but as empirical hypotheses about the functional architecture of
FL, the problematic consequences for language acquisition of weak constraints
such as GEN are intuitively easy to see.
Suppose that, using any general learning strategies at your disposal, you are
given the task of acquiring the semantics (ST ) of a target I-language (IT ). To do
this, you are given subsets of the language (LT ) generated by IT and some hints
about what ST cannot be like. Suppose that the only ‘hint’ about ST—the only
hint about the form of the SRs—that you are given is that it satisfies something
like GEN . This amounts to the following hint: for a complex expression e of
any type generated by IT , JeK is determined by the meanings and structure of
its immediate parts, and possibly any other general beliefs which are consistent
with the data. Given only this hint, you would begin the task of acquiring the
SRs of IT with a substantially unconstrained hypothesis-space. Even if you
eventually acquire ST , you would have to consider and reject many reasonable
but ‘incorrect’ construction-specific SRs such as (18)-(20). You would have
to learn, as you encounter more LT data, that only some construction-specific
SRs that involve extensional feedback and/or some subsets of general beliefs
are correct for IT .
This process of testing and rejecting reasonable construction-specific SRs is
not a process which we ever, at least systematically, observe in actual patterns of
early linguistic development, which suggests that normal speakers do not begin
the acquisition of target I-languages with a MDC as unconstrained as GEN .
It is natural to think that we can, if not avoid, at least weaken the force of
this objection by defending instead a constrained version of GEN . For example,
consider a MDC, call it ‘GEN+’, which allows non-compositional SRs but only
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of the extensional feedback type. We need not state GEN+ in detail, since it
is obvious how to do this. GEN+ might seem like an ad hoc MDC, proposed
merely to reject CO. However, extensional feedback beliefs have a special place
amongst our general beliefs, e.g., they are explicitly stored in memory, are for the
most part easily retrievable, and can be incorporated into meaning assignments
without having to appeal to complicated inferential computations. So it is
not implausible to suggest that FL has selective access to extensional feedback
beliefs, but not to other types of general beliefs. Another option is a MDC,
call it GEN∗, which allows non-compositional SRs that involve only highly-
weighted beliefs. Highly-weighted beliefs also have a special place amongst our
beliefs. There is no known reason to deny that FL has selective access only
to highly weighted beliefs, but not to other types of general beliefs. However,
note that the construction-specific non-compositional SRs used in (18)-(20) are
compatible with both GEN+ and GEN∗, since they refer only to sets of highly-
weighted extensional feedback beliefs. So the same sort of general objection
raised against LOC and GEN can be raised against GEN+ and GEN∗.
6 Objections and Open Issues
All the MDCs we examined can account for P&S, but the non-compositional
ones predict incorrect patterns of early linguistic development. This strongly
suggests that CO is the most plausible MDC currently on the table. Let us
now consider some objections to this argument.
Objection 1: Is CO as descriptively adequate as the non-
compositional MDCs?
Assume that a MDC satisfies the condition of ‘descriptive adequacy’ relative
to L if an I-language compatible with it generates L. One might question the
claim that, in terms of descriptive adequacy relative to English and other natu-
ral languages, CO and the non-compositional MDCs are on equal footing. We
did show, for each type of complex expression which motivated the introduction
of a non-compositional MDC (meteorological expressions for LOC and exten-
sional feedback complex NP s for the versions of GEN), that there are plausible
accounts of how their meaning is determined compatible with CO. However,
these types of expressions are only a subset of the types of expressions often
considered problematic for compositionality, which include conditionals, geni-
tives, nominal compounds, etc. If some of these types of expressions can only
be given a non-compositional account, then relative to descriptive adequacy CO
is in worse shape than some of the non-compositional MDCs. Indeed, several
critics have argued that the view that FL is compositional is empirically false
because the meanings of various types of complex expressions don’t seem to be
compositionally determined (see e.g. Fodor [22], Lahav [42] and Hampton [32])
This is a reasonable worry, but as is clearly illustrated in most recent sur-
veys on this issue, it has been substantially addressed by the collective effort of
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theorists who have proposed various compositional accounts for each of the prob-
lematic constructions.17 These compositional accounts generally use the tools
we used to show that there are CO compatible accounts of the meaning of sim-
ple meteorological expressions and extensional feedback complex NP s: lexical
context-sensitivity, primary pragmatic processes, including meaning modula-
tion, and lexical entries which in occasions of used are informationally enriched.
The moral we should draw from this is that, as things currently stand, there are
no types of expressions that can be taken as direct empirical counter-examples
to CO.18 This is why to resolve debates about the MDC of FL we need to
move beyond descriptive adequacy.
To be clear, a consequence of adopting CO is that some data and intuitions
about the meaning of certain expressions have to be dealt with at the level of
pragmatics, hence not by appealing only to the workings of FL. With some
important differences, most theorists accept this. For example, Borg [6]and
other minimalists propose that we substantially ‘clean’ the data coming from
meaning intuitions; while Recanati [66] and other contextualists try to account
for a wider range of our pre-theoretical meaning intuitions. In discussions of
competing MDCs what is important, when one of the accounts deals with
some pre-theoretic intuition only in conjunction with non-linguistic cognitive
processes, is that such decisions follow in a principled way from the assumed
division between semantics and pragmatics, a division which everyone, including
non-compositionalists, have to accept.
Objection 2: Why doesn’t CO over-generate meanings in
ways that parallel the non-compositional MDCs?
Assume CO is descriptively adequate in the sense just specified—and especifi-
cally that I-languages compatible with it can account for meteorological expres-
sions and extensional feedback complex NP s. Why, if a CO constrained FL can
account for that phenomena, can’t it also over-generate meanings in a way that
parallels the reasonable but unattested mistakes allowed by FLs constrained by
non-compositional MDCs such as LOC and GEN?
Consider a way in which CO could allow mistakes that seem to mirror the
sorts of mistakes which we used to object to non-compositional MDCs. Here
is an obvious candidate: if for some speaker S, JcatK = cat and mean if
strong—i.e., if it includes such conditional information—then Jstrong catK
would mean strong and mean cat. We can model this as a result of such
conditional information being included in S’s lexical entry for cat, or of its arising
from particular meaning modulations (enrichments) in certain occasions of use of
17Jonsson [39]: ch. 5 presents an up-to-date review of compositional accounts of many
problematic linguistic constructions. See also Dever [18], Szabo [74], [76], Recanati [67],
Pagin [48], [49], and Partee [50].
18At the end of a survey of ‘problem cases’ for compositionality, Jonsson concludes—echoing
other theorists—that ‘whether semantic theories in the end should be compositional...cannot
be settled by attempting to provide examples that cannot be handled by a compositional
(explicated in terms of CO) account since there does not seem to be any such cases’ (Jonsson
[39]: ch. 5).
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cat. Similar observations can be used to generate incorrect locative restrictions
in cases such as gray cat. Suppose such (incorrect) conditional information
could, in certain circumstances, be part of the occasion meaning of lexical items;
you might then suspect that a CO constrained FL could give rise to the same
incorrect patterns we invoked against the non-compositional MDCs.
In response, note that the mistake when S determines, under CO, Jstrong catK
can be traced to an overly enriched standing or occasion meaning for cat, hence
does not systematically affect the meaning-assignments to other expressions,
including complex expressions that do not have cat as a constituent. So mis-
takes which can be traced to lexical items (which are allowed by CO and by
the non-compositional MDCs) are quite different from those allowed only by
the non-compositional MDCs. Consider (19) above, which involves the SR
“J[NPmAm Nan]K = fNPm(fNP (JAmK, JNanK), b+)”, where ‘NPm’ is a category
of NP s formed by mental trait As and Ns for animate beings. In (19), S is
testing a non-compositional construction-specific SR, allowed by GEN , which
systematically assigns to expressions of the form [NPmAm Nan]—such as fierce
lion, courageous soldier, angry pit-bull, loving father—a meaning which includes
an incorrect (but reasonable) locative restriction. The mistake in (19) is not due
to a particular lexical item, and affects a much wider range of expressions than
the subset of expressions of which that item is a constituent. The mistake is
due to S’s ‘trying out’ an incorrect non-compositional SR for expressions of the
form [NPmAm Nan]. The objections which I raise against LOC, GEN , and its
variants are of that form. They apply even under the assumption that S assigns
the correct meanings to all lexical items.
In short, it is not true that the relevant patterns of mistakes that can occur
assuming LOC or GEN can also occur assuming CO, which blocks speakers
from considering construction-specific SRs. The reason why CO, which allows
meaning modulation of lexical items, does not allow patterns of mistakes anal-
ogous to (11)-(13) and (18)-(19) is due to the case-by-case nature of pragmatic
modulations: whether S takes an utterance of gray shark to mean gray shark
when underwater or strong cat to mean strong and mean cat, under this
account, depends on particular features of the contexts of utterances. In other
words, it is a case-by-case decision which does not systematically affect S’s literal
meaning assignments to expressions of the same form in other contexts, for S’s
FL, constrained by CO, cannot acquire construction-specific non-compositonal
SRs. In contrast, if S, constrained by one of the non-compositional MDCs,
is trying out a construction-specific non-compositional SR, then the inclusion
of the locative restrictions or general beliefs would result automatically—i.e.,
from the automatic processing of FL—and would range over all expressions
(including novel ones) of the form over which the adopted SR ranges.19
19I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for a detailed discussion of this objection.
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Objection 3: Aren’t we ignoring crucial trade-offs between
CO and the non-compositional MDCs?
One might argue that the previous argument for CO depends on ignoring the
full set of trade-offs between the competing MDCs. Take the arguments against
LOC and GEN . We said that we can account for the meaning of simple mete-
orological expressions and extensional feedback complex NP s in ways that are
consistent with CO. But to do that we have to assume that there is a distinction
between the standing and the occasion meaning of expressions, that modula-
tion functions can further modify the occasion meaning of lexical items, and
that some of these modifications consist of enriching their meaning (see section
4). However, except for dealing with an over generation worry in Objection 2,
we didn’t carefully consider other costs of using those tools.
The key to address this worry is to note that, as far as we know, these are
tools which we need to incorporate into any plausible linguistic model, including
those that adopt a non-compositional MDC, to account for expressions other
than simple meteorological expressions or extensional feedback complex NP s.
This is obvious in the case of having to appeal, as Borg, Recanati, and Glucks-
berg do, to (primary) pragmatic effects to account for the intuitive meaning of
tokens of certain types of complex expressions. Furthermore, assuming that lex-
ical items are semantically non-atomic and include rich arrays of information is
also becoming popular in accounts of genitives, possessives, privative As and ad-
verbial modifications (see Vikener and Jensen [82], Coulson and Fauconnier [15],
and Wunderlich [84]). Finally, (although here we did not appeal to this tool) as-
suming that some lexical items, which are not obvious indexicals, have context-
sensitive parameters is common in recent accounts of words like tall, flat, green,
home, faraway etc. (see Szabo [74], Segal and Rothschild [70], Kennedy and
McNally [41], and Recanati [67]: ch. 3). Non-compositional MDCs also have
to account for these sorts of expressions, and to do so have, in many cases,
to use these same tools, for the non-compositional SRs which are allowed by
each non-compositional MDC do not provide a general way to deal with all
or most of these expressions. So whatever the cost of introducing these tools,
it is also incurred by models which adopt non-compositional MDCs. In addi-
tion, the non-compositional MDCs, but not CO, also introduce other technical
tools—non-compositional, construction specific SRs—which have problematic
consequences for language acquisition.
Objection 4: Why not take CO as just a default or cognitive
bias?
An interesting response to the claim that CO is more plausible than any of the
non-compositional MDCs is to propose a middle-ground. The idea is that we
interpret CO as a default or cognitive bias of FL, such that under certain con-
ditions language learners can drop this default and acquire non-compositional
construction-specific SRs. There are various ways of implementing this pro-
posal. For example, we can formulate a ‘mixed’ MDC, call it ‘CO(LOC)’, that
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has CO as a default and LOC as a secondary constraint on SRs. Following the
same recipe, we can construct a MDC, call it ‘CO(GEN)’, that has CO as a
default and GEN as a secondary constraint on SRs. To fully determine if mixed
MDCs with a compositional default are more plausible than CO would require
an extensive discussion; here I will only briefly explain why it seems unlikely.
The challenge for mixed MDCs is to specify the properties of the learn-
ing data that would trigger the use of the non-default part of the constraint,
i.e., the search for a non-compositional SR. The triggering conditions would
have to include data that can be reliably used to infer that a compositional
SR does not output the correct meanings for tokens of some type of complex
expression, e.g., for tokens of simple meteorological expressions or extensional
feedback complex NP s. For concreteness, let us focus on CO(LOC) (the points
I make apply equally well to CO(GEN)). The point of proposing that we re-
place CO with CO(LOC) is to allow speakers to acquire construction-specific
non-compositional SRs that assign location restrictions to meteorological ex-
pressions, while keeping a general bias for compositional SRs for at least most
other types of complex expressions. So the triggering conditions have to meet
two requirements: (i) token assertions of meteorological expressions trigger the
search for a non-compositional SR, and (ii) token assertions of complex expres-
sions that do not have a location restriction do not trigger the search for a
non-compositional SR (which would explain why we don’t observe patterns of
mistakes like those in (11)-(13)). What could the triggering conditions be?
One might think that the search for a non-compositional SR should be trig-
gered when S concludes that the meanings of complex expressions of some type
seem to involve location restrictions, and that these meanings do not match the
compositionally determined (default) meanings, which do not involve location
restrictions. Things are not so simple, however, for data about the meanings of
complex expressions, which comes mostly from linguistic interchanges, is usually
noisy and plagued with mismatches between the compositionally determined and
the asserted content of tokens of complex expressions. Speakers have tools to
deal with these mismatches without having to revise the relevant default com-
positional SRs (see Objection 3 above). For example, in the case of assertions
of meteorological expressions, speakers could assume that the location restric-
tions are due to primary pragmatic effects, such as the free-enrichment of the
meanings of tokens of lexical items such as rains and snows. The question then
is this: under what conditions should language learners resolve the mismatches
between the asserted and the compositionally determined meanings of tokens
of complex expressions of some type without using any of these available tools,
but by revising instead the relevant construction-specific SRs?
This question reveals the problem with CO(LOC) and other mixed MDCs
with a compositional bias: simply put, all the ways of specifying the trig-
gering conditions either render the mixed MDCs superfluous, or entail incor-
rect patterns of linguistic development similar to those entailed by pure non-
compositional MDCs. On the one hand, if the conditions that trigger the search
for a construction-specific, non-compositional SR are too demanding, this search
would never begin. This is because, as we just said, most cases of mismatches
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between the asserted and the compositionally determined meanings of tokens of
complex expressions of some type (including those involving meteorological ex-
pressions) can be resolved without revising the default compositional SRs, e.g.,
by revising instead the relevant lexical entries or factoring-in systematic pri-
mary pragmatic effects. In this case, replacing CO with a more complex mixed
MDC such as CO(LOC) would be an entirely superfluous theoretical move.
On the other hand, if we weaken the conditions that trigger the search for a
non-compositional SR, this search would be triggered by mismatches (involving
location restrictions) between the asserted and the compositionally determined
meanings of tokens of expressions of various types, in addition to meteorologi-
cal expressions. In this case, we would expect to find some speakers that test
‘incorrect’ SRs such as those in (11)-(13). For if we assume these weak trig-
gering conditions, why would speakers resolve location restriction mismatches
by revising the relevant SR in the case of meteorological expressions but not
in the case of other types of expressions such as those in (11)-(13)? However,
as we argued before, there is not much, if any, testing of non-compositional
construction-specific SRs going on in early language acquisition, contrary to
what would be predicted by mixed MDCs such as CO(LOC) when paired with
weak conditions that trigger the search for non-compositional SRs.
Objection 5: Why can’t MDCs be learned?
We argued that we should understand MDCs as innate constraints on the func-
tional architecture of FL, specifically, as innate ‘over-hypotheses’ on SRs, i.e.,
constraints on the general form of the SRs which FL is cognitively capable of
representing. But are we really forced to hold that MDCs are innate?
Learning from experience requires some innate constraints. In particular,
FL must have some innate constraints which help speakers learn the semantics
of target I-languages. However, maybe the innate constraint on FL is more
abstract than particular MDCs such as CO, LOC, or GEN , and is more like
an ‘over-over-hypothesis’ which constrains possible MDCs in a way analogous
to the way in which MDCs constrain possible SRs. This more abstract con-
straint, call it ‘O(MDC)’, could constraint possible MDCs so that each allows
only SRs that, for any type of complex syntactic structure [ZX Y ], determineJ[ZX Y ]K as a function of the meaning of its immediate constituents {X, Y},
and possibly something else. Although weak, O(MDC) does restrict the set of
possible MDCs. Speakers would still have to learn which of CO, LOC, GEN ,
etc., is correct for the target I-language. If constrained only by something like
O(MDC), then early in linguistic development S could consider, among others,
SRs such as:
(21) J[ZX Y ]K = fZ(JXK, JY K)
(22) J[ZX Y ]K = fZ′(fZ(JXK, JY K), b)
(23) J[ZX Y ]K = fZ′′(fZ(JXK, JY K), g)
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where ‘b’ stands for a set of extensional feedback and ‘g’ for a location function.
According to this view, when testing hypotheses like (21)-(23) against the data
(i.e., subsets of the language), S not only selects the best fitting SR, but at
the same time, and prior to acquiring other particular SRs, S also selects the
best fitting MDC. For example, if S determines that (21) generates the correct
meaning assignments for tokens with the form [ZX Y ], this in turn suggests to
S that the MDC is probably closer to CO than to LOC or GEN—assuming
that S applies a learning mechanism which selects the logically strongest and
simplest MDC, among those allowed by O(MDC), which is consistent with the
selected SR.
This sketch of how MDCs could be learned is especially interesting be-
cause in other cognitive domains similar learning processes—of acquiring over-
hypotheses of the sort usually assumed to be innate by nativists—have been
modeled using Hierarchical Bayesian Models (HBMs) (Kemp et al. [40]). To
be clear, the reason we suggested that MDCs are likely innate is not that,
given developmentally plausible subsets of the target language and any power-
ful domain-general learning mechanism, it is otherwise impossible to explain how
someone could acquire a target I-language such as I-English; the reason is that
there seems to be no learning of the relevant sort going on in actual language
acquisition—i.e., no learning of MDCs and even of construction-specific SRs.
Of course, this does not conclusively show that although MDCs could in prin-
ciple be learned they in fact are innate. For without considering specific HBMs,
it is very hard, if not impossible, to determine whether the sorts of patterns
Bayesian learners would have to go through to acquire MDCs—which given
certain ways of modeling the problem, could be quite minimal—are consistent
with the general patterns of early linguistic development. As far as I know, no
HBMs that can acquire particular MDCs have been tested, although in princi-
ple such models can certainly be constructed.20 Still, even if we can construct
cognitively plausible HBMs that can acquire MDCs and so seriously consider
the view that MDCs are acquired early in language acquisition, HBMs have
some general properties which suggest that this result would be consistent with
the main claim defended here—namely, that CO is the MDC on I-languages.
We can illustrate this last point by considering in broad outline a hypothet-
ical HBM (‘HBML’) that, constrained by an O(MDC), acquires a particular
MDC in the processes of acquiring the semantics (i.e., the SRs) of I-English.
20There are two models that might be thought to bear on this issue. The first models the
cultural evolution of natural languages, and shows that ‘compositional’ languages would be
selected over ‘non-compositional’ languages (Kirby [72]). This model is not relevant to our
problem—whether a Bayesian learner, given developmentally plausible bits of the language,
would acquire CO over the non-compositional MDCs—because the ‘non-compositional’ lan-
guages considered by the model are implausible extremes, e.g., they do not satisfy any of the
non-compositional MDCs considered here (they are even more unconstrained). The second
model acquires a ‘compositional semantics’ (Tenenbaum et al. [52]). However, the main task
faced by this model is only to pair simple expressions with lambda-types. The model is set-up
to calculate the meaning of all complex expressions in the same general way, composition-
ally via FA. So this model’s functional architecture instantiates CO—it can’t even represent
non-compositional SRs.
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We know something about the general conditions that would have to be met by
‘HBML’. The process of acquiring a target I-language requires MDCs of some
sort; so HBML has to select a MDC early in the process of acquiring the full set
of SRs, even if this selection is later revised. This is not a problem. As we just
said, HBMs can be set-up to acquire the relevant over-hypotheses before they ac-
quire most of the specific lower-level hypotheses. Now, assume that, given some
subset E1 of English, HBML selects the MDC from the set of CO, LOC and
GEN with the highest conditional probability. HBML computes that as a func-
tion of the prior probability of each MDC—P (CO), P (LOC) and P (GEN)—
and of the likelihood of E1 given each MDC—P (E1|CO), P (E1|LOC) and
P (E1|GEN). HBMs assign the highest prior probability to the simplest over-
hypotheses. CO is the simplest MDC, since it has the fewest free parameters
(for the same reason, compositional SRs are simpler than non-compositional
SRs), so P (CO) > P (LOC) and P (CO) > P (GEN). The likelihoods partly
depend on what is included in E1. We are modeling the earliest stages in the
acquisition of I-English, when speakers are beginning to learn how to determine
the meaning of very simple complex expressions, so E1 includes very simple
complex expressions such as red ball, green apple, and daddy away, each paired
with a representation of a stereotypical exemplar or situation (Pinker [57]). For
this reason, it is safe to hold that the meanings of tokens of complex expres-
sions included in E1 can be generated using a compositional SR, such as (21)
above. Now, compositional SRs such as (21) are compatible with CO, LOC
and GEN . But since LOC and GEN also generate other SRs, e.g., (22) and
(23) respectively, P (E1|CO) > P (E1|LOC) and P (E1|CO) > P (E1|GEN). It
follows that:
(24) P (CO|E1) > P (LOC|E1) and P (CO|E1) > P (GEN |E1)
such that:
(25) P (CO|E1)/P (LOC|E1) > P (CO)/P (LOC) and
P (CO|E1)/P (GEN |E1) > P (CO)/P (GEN)
Informally, (25) tells us that, although HBML is initially biased to favor the
simpler CO over the non-compositional MDCs, HBML favors CO even more
strongly after processing E1. Furthermore, once there is a strong initial bias for
CO, this selection would likely remain stable through the rest of the process of
acquiring I-English, essentially for the reasons given in response to Objection
4. So even if we hold that MDCs are acquired in early language acquisition,
it seems quite likely—given that HBMs are currently our best idea of how this
process could work—that the MDC selected by language learners would be
more like CO than like any of the non-compositional MDCs.
Open Issue: Implications for Constructionist Approaches
Constructionist approaches to language have been gaining popularity (Smith
[73], Hoffman and Trousdale [36]). A full discussion of the implications of our
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argument for CO for Constructionist approaches is outside the scope of this
essay. Still, the issue merits some preliminary discussion, in part because it
might seem that Constructionist approaches are, on the one hand, in tension
with some of the basic assumptions we made about FL, and, on the other,
undermined by the arguments against non-compositional MDCs. However, I
will briefly explain why the implications are more nuanced and interesting.
What sets apart Constructionist approaches from mainstream Generative
approaches is their emphasis on phrasal constructions in language acquisition.
Like traditional lexical items, phrasal constructions are learned pairings of form
and function (for an overview, see Goldberg [28]). Different types of phrasal
constructions are associated with different types of functions. In our termi-
nology, this means that phrasal constructions are associated with particular
construction-specific SRs. According to Constructionist views, for speakers to
determine the meaning of a complex expression of a certain phrasal type, it is
not enough that they know its form and the meanings of its parts; they must
also know which construction-specific SR is associated with the phrasal type.
This entails that Constructionists implicitly reject the strong version of CO
according to which SRs must be general.
We should not conclude from this that our approach and Constructionist
approaches are incommensurable.We can straightforwardly frame a version of
the compositionality debate in a Constructionist framework. But to do that
we have to make an important modification: the compositional MDC would
have to be a weak version of CO which allows construction-specific SRs, but
only compositional ones. The competing non-compositinal MDCs could still
be formulated basically like LOC, GEN , and its variants, since these allow
learned pairings of phrasal types with particular SRs. What distinguishes the
non-compositional MDCs from weak CO is that only the former allow non-
compositional SRs.21
Once framed in this way we can see that the criticism based on unattested
patterns of mistakes such as (11)-(13) and (18)-(20) would apply straightfor-
wardly to a Constructionist approach that assumes one of the non-compositional
MDCs, but not to one that assumes a weak version of CO. For although
weak CO allows construction-specific SRs, it does not allow non-compositional
construction-specific SRs, which blocks cases like (11)-(13) and (18)-(20).22
21Some of the literature that contrasts Constructionist with mainstream Generative ap-
proaches tend to characterize the former as non-compositional (see e.g. Smith [73]: p. 380).
What I think they usually mean when they make those remarks is that Constructionists can-
not accept that FL represents only general SRs, hence they cannot say that, in all cases,
the meaning of a complex expressions is determined by the meaning of the parts and their
structure. But clearly Constructionists can in principle accept a compositional view, as long
as this view allows construction-specific compositional SRs. In this case the position can be
expressed by saying that the meaning of a complex expressions is determined by the parts,
their structure, and the function associated with that structure.
22This is not to deny that our approach is more in tune with mainstream Generative ap-
proaches. For example, some of the considerations we presented in favor of compositionality
tend to support a compositional MDC which only allows general SRs. What I am arguing here
is that, if for other reasons we favor a Constructionist approach, we can frame a version of the
compositionality debate within this approach. Once we do that, we can see that our previous
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Non-compositionalist Constructionists cannot respond that the phrasal form-
function pairings are innate, since they are committed to these pairings being
learned (Goldberg [27, 28], Tomasello [80]). In addition, our argument didn’t
make any strong assumptions about the learning mechanism responsible for ac-
quiring SRs (e.g., they can be domain general), so there is no obvious assump-
tion there to reject (for discussion see footnote 8). Finally, although most Con-
structionist are anti-nativists (Goldberg [27, 29], Tomasello [80]), this does not
force them to deny that, unlike particular SRs, MDCs are plausibly innate; but
if they do deny that, then the remarks made in Objection 5 above—regarding
why Bayesian learners would tend to acquire a compositional over-hypothesis—
directly apply to this case.
In short, our argument for CO is not in tension with all Constructionist ap-
proaches. Accepting a Constructionist approach does require replacing a strong
version of CO with a weaker version. Aside from that, none of the further as-
sumptions we made about FL or language acquisition to defend compositional
MDCs are inconsistent with Constructionist approaches per se. But once prop-
erly modified, the argument for CO supports the view that we should adopt
compositional over non-compositional Constructionists view.
7 Conclusion
Debates about the non/compositionality of FL seem to reach a standstill when
we acknowledge, with recent critics, that there are non-compositional MDCs
that can account for P&S. To resolve this standstill, we first argued that we
should frame these debates as debates about which MDC is the most plau-
sible functional constraint on the semantics of FL, specifically, on the allowed
forms of SRs which FL can represent. We then saw that each non-compositional
MDC involves a weakening of CO, the point of which is to make FL compatible
with some adequate non-compositional (construction-specific) SRs. However,
theorists generally fail to notice that each weakening also makes FL compat-
ible with many other incorrect SRs. As a result, if FL was constrained by
these non-compositional MDCs, speakers would, in the course of early linguis-
tic development, have to test and reject at least some reasonable but incorrect
construction-specific non-compositional SRs. This predicts patters of early lin-
guistic development which actual speakers never seem to go through. In con-
trast and more consistent with actual linguistic development, CO predicts pat-
terns of development that do not involve any testing of reasonable but incorrect
construction-specific SRs. We also considered some seemingly plausible addi-
tional constraints on the non-compositional MDCs which seek to constrain the
search space of construction-specific SRs during acquisition. The two main pro-
posals are that construction-specific SRs are innate and that non-compositional
MDCs are the non-default options of complex MDCs with compositional de-
faults. We showed that none of these moves saved the non-compositional MDCs
without giving rise to other unacceptable problems. This strongly suggests that
argument favors weak compositional over non-compositional Constructionist approaches.
33
the MDC of FL is closer to CO than to any of the non-compositional MDCs
currently on offer. Admittedly, this argument for CO is not a wholly general
argument that ranges over all conceivable non-compositional MDCs combined
with all conceivable additional constraints. This is why it is important that the
particular non-compositional MDCs and additional constraints which we ex-
amined are currently the most plausible, motivated and popular. Perhaps more
importantly, this overall approach—which focuses the implications of MDCs
on patterns of language acquisition via their constraints on the SRs which FL
can represent—can be used to evaluate future proposals for MDCs.
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